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INTRODUCTION 
In 1988, Justice Antonin Scalia penned an opinion in Budinich v. 
Becton Dickinson & Co., ruling a court’s decision final regardless of 
whether there had been a decision rendered regarding attorney’s fees.1 
A quarter of a century later, citing the same case in oral arguments be-
fore the Court, an attorney suggested, “if you have a dispute between a 
lawyer and a . . . former client, over fees . . . and there’s a lawsuit to re-
cover the fees, Budinich won’t apply in that situation.”2 Justice Scalia 
disagreed: “I wrote it,” he interjected, eliciting laughter. “I don’t think 
that’s what I meant.”3 
On the surface, Justice Scalia’s offhand comment on a rather esoter-
ic case seems fairly innocuous. But Supreme Court watchers might be 
forgiven for thinking that someone else was occupying Justice Scalia’s 
seat that day. Where had “the resolute text-reader, dictionary-minder, 
expectation-scorner” gone?4 If, as Justice Scalia has elsewhere argued, 
“government by unexpressed intent is . . . tyrannical [and] it is the law 
that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver,”5 then surely it is the judg-
ment that governs, not the intent of the judge? 
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 1 486 U.S. 196, 202-203 (1988) (Scalia, J., opinion) (“[A] decision on the merits is a ‘final de-
cision’ for the purposes of [federal law] whether or not there remains for adjudication a re-
quest for attorney’s fees.”). 
 2 Transcript of Petitioners’ Oral Argument at 13, Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension 
Fund, 571 U.S. _____ (2014) (No. 12-992). 
 3 See Josh Blackman, Scalia: “I wrote it, I don’t think that’s what I meant”, JOSH BLACKMAN’S 
BLOG (Dec. 9, 2013), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/12/09/scalia-i-wrote-it-i-dont-
think-thats-what-i-meant/. 
 4 See Ronald M. Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 115, 126 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 5 ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
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Indeed, Justice Scalia’s lapsus linguae (slip of the tongue)6 reveals a 
broader problem with theories of legal interpretation. We enjoy a 
thriving literature on constitutional and statutory interpretation, of 
which Justice Scalia’s writings on original public meaning rank 
amongst the most prominent contributions. But how are we to inter-
pret the rulings or judgments themselves? What theory of interpreta-
tion should one apply to Supreme Court rulings? Should one be an 
originalist ‘judgmentist,’ or a living ‘judgmentist’? And are there con-
flicts or problems of coherence that emerge when one chooses to in-
terpret the Constitution and Supreme Court judgments in either an 
originalist or progressive fashion? 
A. Progressivism’s incoherence 
In this essay, we demonstrate the incoherence within progressive 
legal theory by applying progressives’ own criticisms of originalism to 
their adherence to Supreme Court precedents. We argue that progres-
sives face a dilemma: either archetypal progressivism is impractical, or 
it is inconsistent. On the one hand, the wholesale application of pro-
gressivism demands that all actors (non-judicial actors and the Su-
preme Court alike) are entitled to progressive interpretation. This, 
however, risks an ‘explosion’ of interpretation. On the other hand, pro-
gressives might argue that only the Supreme Court is entitled to a pro-
gressive interpretation, while other government actors are obligated to 
read their rulings in an originalist fashion. However, this would effec-
tively undermine the force of their objections to originalism in the first 
place. 
We trace out a similar argument from the Canadian context to the 
American one. In our view, the American progressive is hypocritical in 
rejecting originalism as a viable theory of Constitutional interpretation 
while simultaneously embracing an originalist approach to interpret-
ing Supreme Court judgments. Our essay proceeds as follows: 
First, we sketch out the plethora of reasons offered by progressives 
to object to originalism in all its varieties (including intentionalism). 
These include progressive claims that frozenness (the ‘fixation’ thesis) 
and adherence to particular meanings (the ‘fidelity’ thesis)—both ten-
ets of originalism—render outcomes that are incoherent, tyrannical, 
and impractical. We demonstrate that these objections apply with 
equal strength to originalism as a theory for interpreting judgments. 
Second, we show that the archetypal American progressive needs 
also to advance a form of ‘judicial supremacy.’ Assuming we preferred 
 
 6 In a tongue-in-cheek fashion, we borrow Justice Scalia’s phrase. Id. at 20. 
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courts to deliver progressive judgments, we would also need some way 
to ensure it is those judgments that are authoritative. A failure to estab-
lish such authority leads to the impractical ‘explosion of progressiv-
ism,’ wherein each and every lower judicial officer interprets the law 
according to his or her own perception of contemporary values. We 
then point out the ills of an ‘explosion’ of judgment, demonstrating the 
need for living constitutionalists to adhere to stare decisis and judicial 
supremacy. 
Third, we show that progressives’ efforts to avoid the explosion 
forsake pure progressivism. In this event, we show that American pro-
gressives have committed the sin of embracing the very same ‘frozen-
ness’ for judgment interpretation that they regard as a sufficient rea-
son to abandon originalism when it comes to constitutional 
interpretation. The progressive is guilty of advocating “progressivism 
for me but not for thee.” 
Finally, we consider the availability of alternate routes for progres-
sives to escape this untenable ‘explosion of progressivism,’ but con-
clude that there are none. If American progressives are to ensure the 
strength of progressive rulings and also contain the ‘explosion of pro-
gressivism,’ they must accept the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Con-
comitantly, progressives must accept (and have accepted) standard 
features of the very originalism that they claim to reject. 
B. Review: Is the ‘explosion of progressivism’ contained to Canada? 
In a previous work,7 one of us noted that contemporary proponents 
of a progressive (or “living tree”) doctrine of interpretation in Canada 
simultaneously embrace two contradictory theses. On the one hand, 
they argue, Supreme Court justices are to deliver judgments on the ba-
sis of society’s contemporary values. Yet on the other, the ‘doctrine of 
judicial supremacy’ advocates that all lower judicial and non-judicial 
actors must strictly observe said progressive rulings of the Supreme 
Court. Because adherence to the first thesis can lead to an ‘explosion of 
progressive interpretation’ – a free-for-all where each government ac-
tor is entitled to act on the basis of what they consider to be contempo-
rary values – it fails to cohere with the latter thesis of judicial suprem-
acy, and indeed, contradicts it rather directly. 
Distinct parallels with the United States emerge. On one end of the 
progressive spectrum are academics like Michael Perry, who advocates 
for a doctrine of “consensualism” that echoes pure progressivism.8 
 
 7 Peter M. Jaworski, Originalism All the Way Down. Or: The Explosion of Progressivism 26:2 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE (2013): 313-340 
 8 MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW 155 (1988). 
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Where applied to the 14th Amendment, consensualism dictates that 
“[l]iberty includes only what a current social consensus says it in-
cludes.”9 Since the majority of Americans only support abortion where 
there is “rape, incest and serious fetal deformity”, Roe v. Wade ought to 
have limited the constitutional right to an abortion to those cases.10 
Yet most American progressives generally tend to be more nu-
anced. Jack Balkin, for instance, rejects the idea that the Supreme Court 
should simply be a “mirror” that “reflect[s] popular opinion.”11 In Liv-
ing Originalism, Balkin offers the countervailing idea of “framework 
originalism”, where the Constitution offers an “initial” outline to be 
filled out by future political and judicial branches.12 With some differ-
ences, David Strauss and Laurence Tribe also share Balkin’s position 
on the progressive spectrum. “Living constitutionalism,” as articulated 
by Strauss, takes a “common law” approach toward “constitutional is-
sues . . . that arise in a large, complex, diverse, changing society.”13 This 
nuanced version of progressivism partakes in Justice Harlan’s meta-
phor of the Constitution as a “living tradition.”14 The Constitution 
evolves in accordance with changing social mores. 
Although Balkin, Strauss and Tribe reserve a role for other actors in 
their progressive vision, all progressives place the Supreme Court in a 
primary position. In so doing, American progressives, like their Cana-
dian counterparts, defend a theory of judicial supremacy that is at odds 
with their advocacy of progressivism based on contemporary values.15 
Noting these similarities, we extend the problems of progressivism 
from the Canadian context to an American one. The incoherence of ad-
vocating progressivism while adhering to stare decisis means that 
American progressives are just as Janus-faced as their Canadian coun-
terparts. More broadly, we believe this incoherence hints at a more 
 
 9 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER AND JAMES A. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 70-71 (2007) (in-
terpreting Perry’s work). 
 10 Id. 
 11 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 288 (Harvard University Press 2011). 
 12 Id. at 21-22. 
 13 DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 34-35 (2010). 
 14 Justice Harlan famously opined that the “content” of the 14th Amendment “cannot be de-
termined with reference to any code.” Instead, it has been determined by “the balance 
which our Nation… has struck between [individual] liberty and the demands of organized 
society.” This balance was evident in the “traditions from which it developed as well as the 
traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.” Ullman v. Poe, 367 U.S. 497, 
542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 15 Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes is known to have remarked, “we are under a Constitu-
tion, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is.” CHARLES E. HUGHES, ADDRESSES AND 
PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK: 1906-1908 139 (Jacob Gould 
Schurman ed., G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1908). 
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significant issue – that of constructing a doctrine of interpretation for 
Supreme Court judgments. 
These questions are not mere exercises in academic speculation. 
“Super precedents” - highly influential Supreme Court decisions that 
have acquired a near-permanent status in American constitutional law 
- significantly affect modern American life.16 To cite just two, consider 
Roe v. Wade17 and Brown v. Board of Education.18 When questioned 
during her confirmation hearings, Justice Sonia Sotomayor considered 
the former to be “the precedent of the court and settled.”19 Conversely, 
Bernard Siegan’s confirmation was stymied because he believed Brown 
to be incorrectly decided.20 Nor is the interpretation of rulings limited 
only to confirmation hearings and superprecedents. Rarely does the 
Supreme Court mention the exact text of the Constitution in its rulings. 
We would be hard pressed, however, to find a Court opinion that did 
not contain a single reference to an earlier decision. 
I. A NEED FOR A THEORY OF ‘JUDGMENT INTERPRETATION’? 
There are a wide number of disputes over which laws overrule 
precedent,21 and whether new judgments supersede old ones.22 How-
 
 16 Michael J. Gerhardt considers ‘super precedents’ to be “constitutional decisions in which 
public institutions have heavily invested, repeated relied, and consistently supported over a 
significant period of time. Super precedents are deeply embedded into our law . . . .” Michael 
J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (2005). 
 17 See generally 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 18 See generally 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 19 Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of the Honorable Sonia Sotomayor S. Hrg. 111-
503 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Congress, 1st Session. S. No. J-111-
34 (2009). 
 20 Siegan felt that “the case is strong that the Thirty-ninth Congress did not seek to adopt an 
amendment that would affect racial segregation in the schools. . .”. Rather, he suggests that 
the legislators “solely comprehended civil rights and not social privileges, voting, office 
holding . . . public schooling, or other political rights.” BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME 
COURT’S CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIETY 89-93 
(1987). Facing strong opposition, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted not to recommend 
his nomination to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals favorably. Ruth Marcus, Senate Committee 
Defeats Siegan Judicial Nomination, WASH. POST, July 15, 1988, available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/07/15/senate-committee-
defeats-siegan-judicial-nomination/c2f17559-b281-4f41-a9eb-5e8493cac308/. 
 21 The Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments were all 
Congressional measures passed to override Supreme Court decisions. 
 22 See e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 397, 429 (1998) (the Supreme Court ruled that flag 
burning was permitted under the free speech protections of the 1st Amendment. Although 
48 states and the federal government had laws that prohibited the desecration of the flag, 
these laws were invalidated.). 
Even though Congress had widespread national support, they did not seek to invali-
date the Supreme Court’s ruling through a Constitutional Amendment. Instead they sought 
to circumvent Texas v. Johnson by expanding the definition of desecration. Congress 
amended the Flag Desecration Act of 1968 and renamed it the Flag Protection Act of 1989. 
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ever, none of these disputes have accurately identified the dissonance 
involved in applying theories of textual interpretation on the Constitu-
tion to an interpretation of the rulings themselves. Originalists and liv-
ing constitutionalists alike lament the fact that American law is built 
upon precedents. Justice Scalia begins his critique of the system by ob-
serving that the “aspiring American lawyer . . . learns the law not by 
reading statutes . . . but rather by studying the judicial opinions that in-
vented it.”23 Strauss concurs: “Advocates know what actually moves 
the Court. Briefs are filled with analysis of the precedents . . . But when 
a case involves the Constitution, the text routinely gets no attention.”24 
And yet if rulings hold such importance in American law, why do 
we lack a consistent theory of interpretation for them? If progressiv-
ism and originalism dominate the academic discourse, why is it that we 
do not apply those interpretive theories in reading judgments? Which 
theory of interpretation ought to prevail when the Supreme Court dis-
agrees with the legislature, or when the Court disagrees with lower 
courts? 25 Let us illustrate the need for such a theory using two seminal 
cases: Brown v. Board of Education and Whitney v. California . 
A. Example 1: Brown v. Board of Education: How do we interpret 
“equitable principles” and “all deliberate speed”? 
In Brown the Supreme Court famously ruled that “[i]n the field of 
public education, the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place.”26 
In the subsequent rehearing, known as Brown II, the Court assigned to 
“[s]chool authorities . . . the primary responsibility for elucidating, as-
sessing and solving [segregation]” and noted that “[F]ull implementa-
 
(18 U.S.C. §700 (1989)). Nevertheless, the Court struck down the law again in 2000. See 
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 310 (2000) (“Appellees’ prosecution for burning a 
flag in violation of the Act is inconsistent with the First Amendment.”). 
 23 SCALIA, supra note 6, at 4. 
 24 STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 34. 
 25 Benesh and Reddick. empirically demonstrate that lower courts generally comply with Su-
preme Court decisions. However, this should not be construed as blind obedience. The Su-
preme Court’s “dialogue” with lower-judicial actors is just as, if not more, sophisticated as 
with the legislature. When lower courts ideologically disagree with a precedent, they have 
multiple legal tools available to them to reduce the degree of compliance (e.g., narrowly in-
terpreting the decision, ignoring it, dismissing it on procedural grounds, etc.). Sara C. 
Benesh and Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to 
Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 534, 536 (2002). 
Conversely, in order to mitigate defiance or half-hearted compliance, the Supreme 
Court also has a range of options available to it. It may name and shame by “revers[ing] a 
circuit court” (Benesh and Reddick, id. at 539) or it might submit per curiam decisions. See 
generally Laura K. Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore, 79 NEB. L. REV. 518, 519 (2000) (discussing 
the “shifting balance between the impersonal and the individual” in per curiam opinions). 
 26 Brown v Board of Education, 347 U.S. 486, 495 (1955) (Warren, C.J., writing for a unani-
mous decision). 
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tion of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied 
local school problems.”27 
However, Brown II specifically noted that “[i]t should go without 
saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be al-
lowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.”28 Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court acknowledged that lower courts may develop 
differing solutions and require varied amounts of time to eliminate de-
segregation. Both allowances came with the respective caveats of 
“be[ing] guided by equitable principles” and “with all deliberate 
speed.”29 
How should lower governmental officials have interpreted these 
caveats? In Cooper v. Aaron, the Warren Court recognized that Arkan-
san School Board officials had sought delays on a “good faith” basis, 
pursuant to the “all deliberate speed” clause. “‘Tension . . . chaos, bed-
lam and turmoil’” had resulted from the actions of Governor Faubus’ 
defiance of Brown.30 The Court rebuked the actions of the governor and 
legislature, firmly stating that its “interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.”31 
In contrast, following Brown, Virginia implemented a policy of 
“Massive Resistance”, refusing to fund all of its public schools.32 After 
this was overturned in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County,33 Virginia implemented a “freedom of choice” plan where pu-
pils could choose their own schools. De facto segregation ensued in 
New Kent County, Virginia, with no white child applying to the black-
designated New Kent School, and no black child applying to the white-
designated Watkins School.34 
The Court sought to reign in these competing interpretations of its 
Brown judgment. Responding to the stalling procedures used by Vir-
ginia officials, Justice Brennan fumed, “it is relevant that this first step 
[“freedom of choice” plans] did not come until some 11 years after 
Brown I was decided . . . Such delays are no longer tolerable for “the 
 
 27 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955). 
 28 Id. at 300. 
 29 Id. at 300-301. On the one hand, the ruling’s exhortations to be bound by the principle of 
desegregation imply an originalist reading of Brown. On the other hand, the leeway given 
for local solutions implies that the Court recognized a need for a “progressive” reading of 
Brown. Of course, if one favors a progressive reading of Brown, it ought to ensue irrespec-
tive of whether the Court declared it to be so. 
 30 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 13 (1958) (Warren, C.J., writing for a unanimous decision). 
 31 Id. 18. 
 32 See Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964). 
 33 See id. at 221-22 (“In April 1959 the General Assembly abandoned ‘massive resistance’ to 
desegregation and turned instead to what was called a ‘freedom of choice’ program.”). 
 34 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 441 (Brennan, J., writing 
for a unanimous decision). 
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governing constitutional principles no longer bear the imprint of newly 
enunciated doctrine.”35 Justice Brennan directly rejected Virginia’s in-
terpretation of “all deliberate speed” – “[t]he time for mere ‘deliberate 
speed’ has run out . . . the context in which we must interpret and apply 
this language [of Brown II] to plans for desegregation has been signifi-
cantly altered . . . The burden on a school board today is to come for-
ward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises re-
alistically to work now.”36 
By Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education it was clear that 
the Court had run out of patience. It declared in oposition to the U.S. 
Department of Education and the School Board of Mississippi that 
“continued operation of segregated schools under the standard of al-
lowing ‘all deliberate speed’ for desegregation is no longer constitu-
tionally permissible.”37 The Supreme Court thus overturned the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ order for an indefinite postponement, and re-
quired the implementation of “unitary school systems” effective imme-
diately.38 
B. Example 2: A consideration of circumstances in Whitney v. California 
Anita Whitney was convicted under the Californian Criminal Syndi-
calism Act. Her conviction rested on the finding that she was a “mem-
ber of the Local Oakland branch of the Socialist Party.”39 The Supreme 
Court ruled unanimously to uphold her conviction. 
Justice Brandeis wrote a separate, powerful defense of free speech. 
He pointed out, “[t]his Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to 
determine when a danger shall be deemed clear; how remote the dan-
ger may be and yet be deemed present, and what degree of evil shall be 
deemed sufficiently substantial to justify resort to abridgement of free 
speech and assembly as the means of protection.”40 However, he ulti-
mately concurred with the majority because he felt that “when Miss 
Whitney did the things complained of, there was in California such 
clear and present danger of serious evil.”41 
Californian Governor C. C. Young acknowledged that he “felt . . . that 
after the constitutionality of the law had been upheld by our highest 
 
 35 Id. at 438. 
 36 Id. 
 37 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 363 (1919). 
 40 Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 41 Id. at 379. 
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court, its penalties must be exacted.”42 However, Young undertook a 
‘progressive’ reading of the judgment by citing Brandeis’ defense of 
free speech as reason for overturning the conviction and pardoning 
Whitney.43 Young then pointed out that according to Brandeis’ criteria 
of clear and present danger, “[t]he Communist Labor Party has practi-
cally disappeared . . . in California . . . I am unable to learn of any activi-
ties of this party, in California at least . . . which ever rendered it a dan-
ger or a menace to our institutions.”44 
Governor Young also disputed the judicial procedures leading up to 
Whitney’s appearance before the Supreme Court. He cited the fact that 
she had not directly incited any violence, the paucity of evidence 
against her, and the death of Whitney’s attorney at trial.45 Young also 
solicited opinions from judges at every stage of the appeals process, 
many of whom felt a pardon was in order.46 Lastly, he consulted the ar-
chitect of the Criminal Syndicalism Act, who articulated that the Act 
had been misapplied.47 Accordingly, Young pardoned Whitney before 
she was imprisoned.48 The Supreme Court ultimately reversed its rul-
ing in Brandenburg v. Ohio by expressing that “Whitney has been thor-
oughly discredited by later decisions.”49 
Governor Young’s read of Whitney is particularly significant. It is 
quite clear that the Governor reached a different conclusion from the 
one the Court reached (i.e. imprisoning Anita Whitney). However, in 
pardoning her, he justified his reasoning by citing Brandeis’ opinion. 
This was done in conjunction with Governor Young’s judgment of the 
social conditions in California vis-à-vis Communism. 
Similarly, Arkansan and Virginian officials arguably interpreted the 
Brown ruling in bad faith. But even then, they did so with reference to 
the leeway of “all deliberate speed” granted in Brown. In both cases, el-
ements of judgments can be vague, ambiguous and include abstract, 
value-laden concepts. Lower-judicial officials may feel justified in en-
acting a ‘progressive’ interpretation of the ruling mediated by ‘on-the-
ground’ conditions. And, at least in the case of Brown, these rulings 
have serious consequences for social justice (or lack thereof). 
 
 42 Clement C. Young, Governor C. C. Young’s Pardon of Charlotte Anita Whitney, reprinted in 
ANITA WHITNEY, LOUIS BRANDEIS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 165, 166 (Haig A. Bosmaijin, ed., 
2010). 
 43 Id. at 170. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 167-168. 
 46 Id. at 171-172. 
 47 Id. at 175. 
 48 Id. at 177. 
 49 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
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Brown and Whitney are but two examples of ambiguous rulings. 
There are many others. The fact that rulings can be ambiguous, cou-
pled with the fact that these rulings have significant practical implica-
tions, suggests a need for a consistent theory of ruling or judgment in-
terpretation. 
II. OBJECTIONS TO ORIGINALISM – A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 
Can we defend progressivism as a theory of judgment interpreta-
tion? In this section, we demonstrate its fallibility via the following 
steps: First, we canvass the principal objections progressives level 
against originalism, including objections to intentionalism and the re-
quirement of fidelity. Second, we show that strict adherence to Su-
preme Court judgments, even progressive judgments, raises the very 
same objections that progressives had heretofore directed at their 
originalist opponents. 
A. The Problem of Intentionalism for Judgments 
Most progressive critiques of originalism begin with intentionalism. 
Indeed, even contemporary originalists reject intentionalism. The fo-
cus on ‘original intention’, with an emphasis on the meaning of the 
Constitution as intended by the founders emerged with Robert H. Bork 
and Raoul Berger’s critique of the Warren Court majority.50 This cri-
tique was furthered in the 1980s with the “Jurisprudence of Original 
Intention.”51 Intentionalism urges us to avoid the “veritable constitu-
tional forest” of the present day by considering the intentions of “those 
who framed the Constitution.”52 
The same decade saw a bumper crop of practical and moral objec-
tions to intentionalism arise. Paul Brest53 and H. Jefferson Powell54 
raised significant practical objections to intentionalism. Brest ques-
tioned the possibility of aggregating and summing the intentions of a 
 
 50 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. REV. 1, 
13-15, 17-19 (1971) on Brown v. Board of Education (1954)(critiquing Warren’s opinion in 
Brown); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 4 (2nd ed. 1997)(critiquing the Warren 
Court more generally). Credit goes to Joseph Hartman for directing us to these two exam-
ples. 
 51 Edwin Meese III, The Attorney General’s View of the Supreme Court: Toward a Jurisprudence 
of Original Intent, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 701, 701-704 (1985). 
 52 Id. at 702. 
 53 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B. U. L. REV. 204 
(1980)(noting that a legislature has multiple people, who can have different opinions and 
intentions). 
 54 See Jefferson H. Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 
(1985)(explaining the shift in how original intent was perceived over time). 
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corporate body like the legislature, while Powell argued that intention-
alism may be self-effacing since many of the founders did not intend 
for their intentions to be decisive. Meanwhile, some originalists them-
selves have raised forceful moral critiques of intentionalism. Justice 
Scalia and John J. Gibbons, for example, have both depicted an unfet-
tered dependence on legislative intent as tyranny.. 55 It is tyrannical to 
use thoughts in the head of legislators as law since no ordinary person 
who is subject to the law can be reasonably expected to know these 
thoughts. All they know, or should be expected to know, is the written 
and promulgated text of the law. By the end of the decade, many in 
both the originalist and progressive camps felt that intentionalism had 
been soundly defeated as a plausible theory of constitutional interpre-
tation. 
It is of course possible that the framers intended for the Constitu-
tion to be read in an open-ended and progressive manner. Chief Justice 
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, for example, indicates some sympa-
thy with this view: “A Constitution . . . requires, that only its great out-
lines should be marked . . . [and] minor ingredients . . . be deduced from 
the nature of the objects [designated]. That this idea was entertained 
by the framers of the American Constitution, is not only to be inferred 
from the nature of the instrument, but from the language.”56 Be that as 
it may, contemporary progressives would nevertheless reject inten-
tionalism in principle. After all, what matters is that we approve of the 
law, that we who are bound by the law regard the law not as an alien 
imposition from the anachronistic past, but as both reflecting and 
aligning with the values of the people governed by it in the present. 
That the framers may or may not have intended or wanted a progres-
sive doctrine of interpretation would be of merely historical and bio-
graphical interest, but it would in no way be decisive or even relevant 
to what doctrine of interpretation we ought to embrace. 
What is interesting, however, is how these objections to intention-
alism for constitutional interpretation apply just as readily to inten-
tionalism for judgment interpretation. Below, we outline in detail two 
objections to intentionalism, showing how they apply to judgments as 
well: 
 
 
 55 SCALIA, supra note 5, at 17; John J. Gibbons, Intentionalism, History and Legitimacy, 140 U PA. 
L. REV. 613, 623 (1991). 
 56 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall, C.J., opinion)(describing the 
language in a constitution). Justice Marshall further posed in the judgment that the 
“[C]onstitution [was] intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted 
to the various crises of human affairs.” Id. at 415. 
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i. Judgments have a life of their own: The tyranny of intentionalism 
for judgment interpretation 
Justice Scalia fiercely derided legislative intent as “simply incom-
patible with democratic government.”57 “Men will intend what they 
will,” he opined, “but it is only the laws they enact which bind us.”58 
Underpinning his criticism is a two-fold understanding of the nature of 
law. On one level, for the sake of fairness, laws that are not “promul-
gated” should not bind citizens, since they were unaware of said laws. 
On another, rules that are not well known cannot count as law, if they 
are not promulgated widely enough to guide behavior. 
John J. Gibbons adds to this critique by posing the pertinent ques-
tion that even if intentionalism is to be considered the right mode of 
interpretation, we should still ask, “who elected the Founders?”59 Un-
less, as Gibbons argues, we engage in the “fiction” that through our 
willingness to abide by the judgments of the Supreme Court (“their 
present spokespersons”) and we find reasons to consent to their origi-
nal intent as discovered by the Court, the current system of Constitu-
tional law “must be found wanting.”60 
We can apply these same objections to intentionalism for constitu-
tional interpretation to intentionalism for judgment interpretation. 
When we look at an ambiguous ruling from the bench, we may be 
tempted to try to figure out what the Justices intended by, for example, 
“all deliberate speed.” But we cannot succumb to this temptation if we 
agree with the reasons stated above for rejecting intentionalism. We 
can dismiss as anachronistic or possibly inconsistent with contempo-
rary values the views, opinions, beliefs, convictions, and whatever else 
may be constitutive of the intentions of Justices who wrote or signed 
on to Brown or Whitney, none of whom now sit on the Supreme Court. 
We can ask as pointed and pertinent a question about Justices who no 
longer sit on the Court as we can of legislators who no longer hold of-
fice. Instead of “who elected them?” we can ask, “who appointed 
them?” The answer will be the same: “not us and not our generation.” It 
would also be just as tyrannical to use the thoughts in the minds of the 
Justices rather than the promulgated text of their ruling, as it would to 
use thoughts in the mind of legislators rather than the text of the 
promulgated law. This is, as Justice Scalia makes plain, as true of the 
intentions of currently sitting Justices as is true of the intentions of 
those who are no longer on the bench. Referring to Chevron v. USA, Jus-
 
 57 SCALIA, supra note 6, at 17. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Gibbons, supra note 55, at 624. 
 60 Id. at 624-625. 
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tice Scalia asks wryly “Do I have to defer to John Paul Stevens because 
he’s the author? ‘Oh John, you wrote Chevron. You must know what it 
means.’ Of course not! John doesn’t know what it means! Once you let 
loose the judicial opinion, John, it has a life of its own, and it means 
what it says.”61 
ii. Too many judges spoil the judgment: Discerning intent from 
amalgamations, dissents and pluralities 
Even if the moral objections to intentionalism could be overcome, 
we would face the very same practical difficulties for intentionalism for 
judgment interpretation as we do for intentionalism for constitutional 
interpretation. There were 55 framers at the Constitutional Convention 
in Philadelphia.62 Many find it hard to believe that there is one unified 
‘intention’ emanating from the Constitution. Instead, it is more likely 
that we will have distinct sets of preferences and expectations inform-
ing the intentions of the 55 individuals, with no way of deciding which 
“intention” should reign supreme. 
If these practical objections are persuasive against intentionalism 
for constitutional interpretation, then they should also persuade us of 
the impracticality of intentionalism for judgment interpretation. The 
Court is a corporate body consisting of nine Justices, how are we to in-
terpret the corporate intention? Since Chief Justice Warren wrote the 
opinion for Brown (1954), should his intentions be given the highest 
priority? What about the intentions of Justices like Jackson and Reed 
who, despite their reservations, signed on to the unanimous opinion? 
Moreover, the problem of aggregating intentions is aggravated by 
concurring opinions. Concurring opinions thus give rise to “plurality” 
or “no-clear-majority” opinions. In 2007, “the number of concurring 
opinions [was] more than half the [total] number of opinions . . . .”63 
These can prove confusing to lower-judicial officials. Davis et al. argue 
that such opinions have “less precedential weight” and “fail[] to give 
definitive guidance as to the state of law to lower courts . . . as well as 
to the legislative, administrative and executive agencies.”64 Using the 
example of obscenity standards for outlawing pornography, Davis et al. 
 
 61 Adam Liptak, On the Bench and Off, The Eminently Quotable Justice Scalia, N.Y. TIMES, May 
12, 2009, at A13. 
 62 JOHN C. MORTON, SHAPERS OF THE GREAT DEBATE AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A 
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 2 (2006). 
 63 Linas E. Ledebur, Plurality Rule: Concurring Opinions and a Divided Supreme Court, 113 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 899, 904 (2008). 
 64 John F. Davis and William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme 
Court, 1974 DUKE L. J. 59, 62 (1974) citing Justice Burger’s opinion in Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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cite the four separate opinions in Roth v. United States and the six sepa-
rate opinions in Jacobellis v. Ohio. The least helpful, but most memora-
ble of all, was Justice Potter Stewart’s infamous “I know it when I see 
it.”65 The judgments led to widespread confusion over which test to 
apply, requiring the Court to “summarily revers[e] convictions.”66 Fi-
nally, the ability of justices to issue dissents poses a further complica-
tion. By the formal rules of precedent, dissents ought not to be accord-
ed weight. And yet landmark rulings often refer to prior dissents. In 
Lawrence v. Texas, citing Justice Steven’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
Justice Kennedy emphatically stated, “Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our 
view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should control 
here.”67 Of course, it is often said that future justices are borrowing the 
reasoning, rather than the authority of the dissent. But the question 
still remains: whose opinion ought to be controlling here? Justice Ste-
vens’ or Justice Kennedy’s? 
B. Originalism’s Sins in the Living Garden of Constitutionalism 
Given the above problems, intentionalism was mainly abandoned in 
favor of ‘New Originalism’ in the 1990s.68 New Originalism’s emphasis 
was on the public meaning of the Constitution. As Justice Scalia put it, 
original public meaning is the meaning that a “reasonable person 
would gather from the text” at the time of the promulgation of the 
law.69 Of course, New Originalists also differ over whether this public 
meaning embodies ‘semantic intentions’–the meaning of the words in 
the text–or ‘application intentions’–the hoped-for or expected applica-
tion of the law to specific cases.70 
Regardless of whether one is an intentionalist or new originalist, all 
flavors of originalism share two theses in common. Lawrence Solum 
calls these the “fixation” and “fidelity” theses. Fixation, says Solum, is 
the descriptive claim that the meaning of the Constitution “was fixed at 
the time of its framing and ratification.”71 What it means now is what it 
meant then. Fidelity, on the other hand, is the normative claim that 
Courts ought to defer to that fixed, original meaning of the Constitu-
 
 65 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J. , concurring) 
 66 Davis and Reynolds, supra n. 64 at 70 citing Justice Burger’s opinion in Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15 (1973). See also Ledebur, Plurality Rule, supra note 63, at 905–10 for four other 
modern cases where plurality opinions have led to confusion over interpretative meaning. 
 67 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (citing 478 U.S. 186). 
 68 See generally Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004). 
 69 Scalia, supra note 5, at 17. 
 70 Whittington, supra note 68, at 610-611. See generally Dworkin, supra note 4, for the clash 
between Justice Scalia and Dworkin on original public meaning. 
 71 Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional Re-
demption, Review, 91 TEX. L REV. 147, 154 (2012). 
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tion. In the context of the ‘Old Originalism’ of the 1980s, this exhorta-
tion was known as “judicial restraint.”72 
Whilst originalists of all stripes are united by the fixation and fideli-
ty theses, progressives are united in their rejection of both theses. For 
the progressive the ‘sins’ of originalism73 are two-fold: 
1. Progressives reject fixation because it ‘freezes’ into place concepts and 
rights that are archaic and irrelevant; 
2. Progressives reject fidelity because we ought not be bound by the 
‘dead hand of the past’; 
As with intentionalism, we outline each of these objections in detail: 
i. Frozen concepts and rights 
Progressives reject the idea that the meaning of the Constitution is 
fixed. They claim that two centuries have wrought significant linguistic 
and cultural changes that make this impractical. One clear example of 
this is the Seventh Amendment that guarantees trial by jury when “the 
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.”74 Clearly that 
amount is no longer a practical guide. When balancing the efficiency 
costs in convening a jury with the individual’s right under the Seventh 
Amendment, judges and legislators are unlikely to locate the fulcrum at 
twenty dollars. 
The Seventh Amendment is not the only complication in reading a 
200-year-old text according to its original meaning. Yet another is the 
contentious “right to bear arms” of the Second Amendment.75 One of 
the most advanced weapons in 1791 was the Belton Flintlock. Belton 
attempted to sell it to the Continental Congress, citing a firing rate of 
20 shots in 16 seconds.76 Today, the most advanced machine gun, de-
veloped by Metal Storm, fires over a million rounds per minute.77 In the 
1960s, the U.S. military developed the Davy Crockett, a “two-man [nu-
clear] weapon carried by hand” that could cause damage of a “sub-
 
 72 J. Clifford Wallace, Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the Moorings, 50 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1981-1982). 
 73 Strauss uses this phrase in Living Constitutionalism, supra note 13, at 7. 
 74 U.S. CONST. art. VII. Even using the Consumer Price Index, this inflation-adjusted amount 
would be US $512 in 2014 rates. It would be quite impractical (and economically ineffi-
cient) to have to empanel a jury every time a civil suit arose for an amount as low as US 
$512. Samuel H. Williamson, Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar 
Amount, 1774 to present, MEASURINGWORTH, (2014), 
http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/result.php. (Apr. 29, 2014). 
 75 U.S. CONST. art. II. 
 76 See PETER FRANCIS, A HISTORY OF GUNS (CreateSpace Publishing 2014). 
 77 Press Release, Metal Storm CEO on Strategy to Commercialization, REUTERS, Jul. 15, 2008, 
1:10 PM, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/07/15/idUS67330+15-Jul-
2008+MW20080715. 
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kiloton yield.”78 If the meaning of the Second Amendment is fixed, and 
if these new weapons count as ‘arms,’ then it appears to follow that 
every American has the right to bear a Davy Crockett or a Metal Storm 
machine gun. For many progressives, that is reason enough to abandon 
the fixation thesis. 
While technological and financial changes make adherence to ‘fro-
zen’ concepts undesirable for progressives, so too do they find ‘frozen’ 
rights to be objectionable. As Barber et al. put it, “[c]onsistently ap-
plied, a framers’-application approach . . . might undermine not only 
the constitutionality of the nation’s labor laws and social welfare pro-
grams; it also would undermine the legality of NASA and the Air Force, 
federal laws against drug abuse . . . and many other practices of mod-
ern government.”79 
As with intentionalism specifically, so too with originalism more 
broadly: if we reject them for constitutional interpretation, we will 
have to reject them for judgment interpretation as well. If anything, 
frozen rights and concepts ought to be a greater concern for judgment 
interpretation because they are more plainly articulated in rulings as 
opposed to the often broad, abstract clauses of the Constitution. Should 
Plessy v. Ferguson continue to enshrine the archaic practice of segrega-
tion just because a prior Supreme Court established it? Should we ac-
cept McCulloch v. Maryland even though those principles were articu-
lated at a time when the American government was far less 
established, and when the problems of modern government today are 
far more extensive? 
ii. Dead hand of the past 
Yet another popular argument is that of the ‘dead hand of the past’. 
There are two strands to the argument. In a previous essay, one of us 
discussed how the ‘dead hand of the past’ objection was a way of re-
jecting the fixation and fidelity theses.80 Here, we present a new way of 
countenancing the ‘dead hand of the past’ critique on practical and 
normative grounds. 
The first is closely related to the idea of frozen concepts and rights. 
Long-dead legislators, or the Americans who constituted the public in 
the past, simply had no conception of the new technologies, lifestyles 
and values that modern Americans have. It hardly seems reasonable 
that we should be governed by their views about how our modern so-
 
 78 Hugh Beach, The Nuclear Battlefield, in THE BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME, 1952-
2002, 31, 36 (Frank Barnaby and Douglas Holdstock eds., 2003). 
 79 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER AND JAMES A. FLEMING, A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 88-89 (2007). 
 80 Jaworksi, supra note 7, 327 
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ciety should be run. James Madison, who led the drafting of the Bill of 
Rights, could not possibly have foreseen modern societal changes vis-à-
vis segregation and the rights of criminal defendants. 
The second strand posits that even if prior legislatures and genera-
tions somehow could have foreseen the problems and technological 
innovations of the twenty-first century, they have no right to establish 
laws governing our society. This strand suggests that rule by former 
legislators, our ancestors, is anti-democratic because they no longer 
hold political office. It is further anathema to basic ideas of fairness, 
because the generations who enacted these laws do not have to live 
under them. Instead, we do. Barnett echoes this very critique by noting, 
“consent morally binds only those who themselves actually consent. 
No one has yet explained how the consent of some of our ancient an-
cestors, and in my case someone else’s ancestors . . . can bind those 
alive today who have not consented . . . the insides of any such theory 
inevitably involve some form of cheat.”81 
If rule by the dead hands of the framers is impractical and anti-
democratic, then the same is true for rule by dead justices. For exam-
ple, President Eisenhower appointed Earl Warren to the bench in 
1953. Justice Warren, however (much to Eisenhower’s chagrin82), 
would author some of Court’s landmark liberal opinions, including 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and Miranda v. Arizona. Brown is 
today one of the most celebrated Supreme Court decisions.83 Similarly, 
Miranda has made an indelible mark on modern day criminology and 
jurisprudence. For instance, Justice Warren’s opinion has been trans-
posed almost word-for-word onto contemporary ‘Miranda warnings.’84 
Regardless of how seminal the Warren Court’s decisions are, pro-
gressives ought to reject an originalist interpretation of these rulings. 
Since Justice Warren retired in 1969 (and passed away in 1974) his au-
 
 81 Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of Faint-Hearted Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 
7, 10 (2006). 
 82 Eisenhower was known to have heavily regretted his decision. He called Justice Warren’s 
appointment “the biggest damn-fool mistake I ever made.” G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: 
A PUBLIC LIFE 129–30 (1982). 
 83 In 2001, Congress established the Brown v. Board of Education 50th Anniversary Commis-
sion via Pub. L. No. 107-41, 115 Stat. 226. The act not only commemorated the landmark 
decision, but also created a foundation to perpetuate the significance of the ruling. 
 84 A typical iteration of the Miranda warning might state: “you have the right to remain silent. 
Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an 
attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you. Do you understand 
the rights I have just read to you?” Pre Arrest Questioning, MirandaRights.org (2009), 
http://www.mirandarights.org/prearrestquestioning.html. The original opinion reads: 
“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, 
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a 
right to the presence of an attorney.” 
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thority ought to be superseded by new justices.85 In the same vein, the 
last serving member of the Miranda majority, Justice Brennan, retired 
in 1990 (and passed away in 1997). Since these justices no longer sit 
on the Supreme Court, and we ought not be ruled by the ‘dead hands’ 
of those who no longer hold office, then Justice Warren’s (and Justice 
Brennan’s) preferences, expectations, or understandings of the Consti-
tution, should not rule us any more for the same reasons that James 
Madison’s preferences, desires, expectations or understanding of the 
Constitution should not rule us. 
iii. Contemporary values 
In place of frozen rights and the dead hand of the past, progressives 
offer a vision of the Constitution that flourishes in the soil of contem-
porary values. Progressives believe that judges, and especially Su-
preme Court justices, need to interpret the Constitution in light of 
evolving societal changes rather than as a ‘dead’ text. Justice Breyer 
leans towards this view when he asserts “[The Framers] wrote a Con-
stitution that begins with the words ‘We the People.’ The words are not 
‘we the people of 1787.’”86 Instead, he submits that there must be ac-
tive liberty – the “‘active and constant participation in collective pow-
er’” by citizens.87 
In fact, especially because of the ambiguity of the Constitution, and 
its constant invocation of American values, there is a need to read it 
contemporaneously. As Justice Brennan puts it, “one cannot read the 
text without admitting that it embodies substantive value choic-
es . . . To remain faithful to the content of the Constitution, therefore, 
[interpretation] must account for . . . these substantive value choices, 
and must accept the ambiguity inherent in the effort to apply them to 
modern circumstances.”88 
 
 
 
 
 85 Of course, we might assume that the Supreme Court’s future rulings on Miranda - most re-
cently in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 547 F.3d 572 (2010) – implicitly reaffirm the Warren 
Court’s judgments in Miranda. However, this does not take into account potential occasions 
where new justices may not have a chance to revisit settled doctrines (since cases are not 
brought before them), or occasions where the rulings of new justices only peripherally 
touch upon the ratio decidendi of old rulings. 
 86 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 4, 25 (2005). 
 87 Id. at 4. 
 88 William J. Brennan, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Speech at Georgetown 
University, Washington D.C., Text and Teaching Symposium: Constitutional Interpretation 
(Oct. 12, 1985). 
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C. The hypocrisy of progressivism: Forbear to judge, for we are original 
sinners all89 
As we have seen, progressives have a long litany of complaints 
against intentionalism and new originalism. Both, they argue, are ty-
rannical. Both rely on original meanings (or intentions) that are diffi-
cult to discern, much less to apply. And both are out of touch with con-
temporary values. 
Surprisingly, no progressive that we’re aware of seems to have no-
ticed that these objections apply to judgment interpretation with equal 
force. This is especially surprising in light of the fact that progressives 
depend upon the Supreme Court to read the Constitution progressively, 
be it as a ‘living document’, or as part of a ‘living tradition.’ Some, such 
as Strauss, depend exclusively on the Court to “have the last word on 
most issues of constitutional law.”90 Others, such as Balkin and Tribe, 
are willing to accept that other players – e.g. the executive and legisla-
tive branches – have roles to play alongside the Court.91 Regardless of 
their stance, progressives indubitably uphold the pre-eminence of the 
Court’s rulings. 
But as we have earlier noted, this adherence to the Supreme Court’s 
judgments is at odds with their objections to originalism. If rule by 
long-dead legislators and generations is objectionably tyrannical, then 
why isn’t rule by long-dead judges also objectionably despotic? If the 
language of Amendments has been rendered archaic by changes in val-
ues and technology, then why isn’t the same true for judgments enact-
ed centuries ago? If the Constitution has to be updated in light of con-
temporary values, shouldn’t Supreme Court judgments be similarly 
updated for the same reasons? And if they are to be updated in accord-
ance with contemporary values, why should that updating be reserved 
to a Supreme Court alone? 
Of course, progressives don’t embrace this apparent incoherence 
flippantly. Rather, as we argue below, they are driven by exigency and 
practicality. Progressives want to prevent what one of us has earlier 
termed the ‘explosion of progressivism.’ The explosion is the judicial 
free-for-all, where everyone is entitled to their conception of what con-
temporary values are. Passing the buck to the Supreme Court is there-
fore a means of mitigating such an explosion. This may well give us 
 
 89 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH, act 2, sc. 2 in THE WORKS OF 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (Alexander Dyce ed., 2nd Ed. Chapman and Hall 1866). 
 90 STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 47. 
 91 For Tribe, the Constitution has “invisible, non-textual foundations and facets” shaped by 
historical contingencies and cultural norms. Tribe treats “a relatively robust form of [judi-
cial review as compared to judicial supremacy] as presumptively desirable.” LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION, 50 (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., Oxford University Press 2008). 
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good reason to subscribe to judicial supremacy. However, it appears to 
come at the expense of the strength of the objections to originalism for 
the sake of practicality. In so doing, they are advocating, albeit unwit-
tingly, an inconsistent, and even hypocritical, stance. 
III. PROGRESSIVISM ALL THE WAY DOWN: 
The Explosion of Progressivism And Its Problems 
Below, we argue that progressivism is untenable. Indeed, none of 
America’s foremost proponents of progressivism advance a form of 
‘pure progressivism.’ This is because decisions on the weighty issues of 
law cannot merely rely on contemporary values. Contemporary values 
are fluid. Consider the American public’s view of abortion. In various 
years from 1996 to 2012, Gallup polled a sample of Americans on 
whether they were pro-choice or pro-life. In six of those 12 years, a 
simple majority identified as pro-choice, and in two of those years the 
majority shifted within the space of three months.92 
If public opinion on abortion has seen significant changes, the issue 
at least has the ability to capture the public’s imagination. For the mul-
tiple cases that fill the Court’s schedule every day, public opinion is 
amorphous, or even non-existent. Ray Haluch, the case we cited in our 
introduction, concerns whether payment of attorney fees constitutes a 
‘final decision.’93 On the same day, the Court also heard about civil lia-
bility under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act - hardly the 
stuff of primetime news.94 
Progressives and originalists alike clearly prize the Supreme 
Court’s ability to decide cases with finality, to ensure some sense of 
certainty with respect to what is the law. Americans can disagree over 
abortion, but there is a settled code guiding their immediate actions on 
the issue. The laws (established by the Court’s ruling) also allow for 
predictability. If they so choose, American women may opt for abor-
tions knowing that they will not be unfairly punished due to the vagar-
ies of public opinion. 
This stability in the law is established through the doctrines of judi-
cial supremacy, vertical stare decisis and horizontal stare decisis. The 
doctrine of judicial supremacy advances legal reasons to submit to the 
Supreme Court’s authority. Because the Constitution has given a clear 
 
 92 Trend from polls in which pro-life/pro-choice was asked in isolation, GALLUP (accessed Apr. 
29, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx#1. 
 93 Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund, 571 U.S. _____, 1 (2014) (No. 12-992). 
 94 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 
(2013) (No. 12-315). 
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“grant of authority” to the Court, we ought to abide by their rulings.95 
Susan R. Burgess lists four cases that highlight how vertical stare deci-
sis “emphatically” accords sole deference to the Supreme Court. This 
was most forcefully articulated in Cooper v. Aaron, where the Supreme 
Court faced down segregationist Arkansan legislators by unequivocally 
stating, “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of 
the Constitution . . . No state legislator or executive or judicial officer 
can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to 
support it.”96 
Vertical stare decisis, requests the same of lower judicial officials, 
but for practical and moral reasons. Vertical stare decisis demands def-
erence to the Supreme Court because of the practicality of not having 
to “[address] every question anew in each case”, or the fairness of like 
cases being treated alike.97 Insofar as progressives agree that the sta-
bility function of law matters, they concede to the need for judicial su-
premacy. 
Horizontal stare decisis, on the other hand, does not definitively 
constrain the Court. On occasion, the Supreme Court reconsiders pre-
vious constitutional decisions. However, this power is reserved solely 
for the Supreme Court, and not for lower judicial officials (who are still 
bound to obey its rulings). Generally speaking, the Court has appeared 
reluctant to overrule past decisions. Some prime examples include 
Brown’s (1954) implicit overruling of Plessy, Lawrence’s explicit over-
turning of Bowers and the “thorough discredit[ing]” of Whitney by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, but despite these well-known reversals, the in-
stances of the Court overruling prior decisions tend to be few and far 
between. 
A. Why Avoid the Explosion? 
Why do progressives have to adhere to the doctrines of stare deci-
sis, or judicial supremacy? Is it necessarily impossible to have progres-
sivism ‘all the way down’? In other words, why must progressives con-
tradict themselves and abandon pure progressivism? 
In principle, progressives have no reason to favor judicial suprema-
cy for legal reasons. Indeed, they seem to reject it. Since the doctrine of 
judicial supremacy suggests that the Constitution reserves the sole role 
 
 95 Jack Wade Nowlin, Authority Doctrines and the Proper Judicial Role, in OURSELVES AND OUR 
POSTERITY 65 (Bradley C.S. Watson ed., 2009).; See generally, Frederick Schauer, Judicial Su-
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 96 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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of its interpretation to the Supreme Court, to the extent that this exhor-
tation arises from an originalist reading of the Constitution, progres-
sives ought to shun it. Rather, the progressive chooses the lesser evil of 
stare decisis for practical reasons. Without resort to vertical or horizon-
tal stare decisis the explosion is certain to ensue. With reference to the 
American context, we demonstrate two ways in which this explosion is 
‘triggered’: 
i. Disagreement and discord 
Absent judicial supremacy, it is not hard to conceive of situations 
where the lower courts and non-judicial actors disagree with one an-
other. Much has been written on the false consensus effect, where indi-
viduals believe that the majority of the population holds similar beliefs 
as they do.98 A recent study on the false consensus effect online shows 
that on controversial issues like the death penalty, gun control and 
moral education in public schools, “respondents whose opinions are 
strongly supportive estimate general support to be significantly great-
er than those respondents who hold moderate or unfavorable opin-
ions.”99 The Internet, it seems, has a greater propensity to create ‘echo 
chambers’, reinforcing the false consensus effect. A similar study on 
comments on political blogs shows that there is an “agreement to disa-
greement ratio of 9:1.”100 
If individuals disagree with each other over what the societal con-
sensus is, the settlement function of law will be disabled. The predicta-
bility of laws on privacy, transportation, and commerce that Americans 
rely upon to guide their actions will be thrown into chaos. Moreover, 
rival interpretations may imperil the rule of law, preventing disadvan-
taged groups from accessing its protections. 
In The Invisible Constitution, Tribe progressively envisions an opti-
mistic “gyroscopic construction” where different actors have the ability 
to interpret the Constitution.101 To prevent the whole edifice from be-
ing pulled apart at the seams, he suggests that “majoritarian politics 
will probably hold the line,” preventing any one interpreter from going 
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too far out of bounds.102 Of course, Tribe may be a little too sanguine 
about the effort it takes to reel in rival interpretations. Despite putative 
judicial supremacy within the American constitutional system, disa-
greement with the Supreme Court’s rulings has generated problems on 
the ground. Decades after its initial ruling in Brown, the competing in-
terpretations of Arkansan, Virginian and Mississippian legislators, rely-
ing in part on their Southern societies’ consensus on segregation, 
forced de facto segregation upon children of color. This was despite the 
Court’s declaration of “supreme” authority in Cooper v. Aaron. 
ii. Self-interested interpretations 
What we have earlier considered are genuinely held differing inter-
pretations about Supreme Court rulings. But it is not hard to point to 
examples of self-serving interpretations of judgments, or the Constitu-
tion. Indeed, legislators in Virginia, Arkansas and Mississippi were al-
most certainly more likely to have racist tendencies than a sincere be-
lief that the Constitution permitted segregation. Nowhere was this 
more evident than in Arkansas, where Eisenhower was forced to mobi-
lize the 101st Airborne Division against Governor Orval Faubus. Fau-
bus, in direct opposition to Brown, had ordered the Arkansan National 
Guard to prevent black children from entering a high school.103 
It would be difficult to imagine progressives advancing such an un-
palatable agenda as segregation. And yet, pure progressivism would 
allow for the possibility of self-interested interpretation. Racist gover-
nors might use ‘contemporary values’ as a pretext for their bigotry. 
Moreover, pure progressivism would permit each and every individual 
(and not just governors) to champion his or her own version of con-
temporary values. Doctors might choose to implement (or not) abor-
tions by selecting whichever poll showed a majority (or minority) in 
favor of Roe v. Wade. Police officers might vacillate between Gallup or 
Pew studies, depending on which showed polling data skewed toward 
their own views on Miranda v. Arizona. 
B. The Contradiction of Progressivism 
In the interests of practicality, progressives are thus bound by stare 
decisis. The doctrines of stare decisis and judicial supremacy, however, 
require fixation and fidelity – the very theses that progressives reject. 
When rulings issue forth from the Supreme Court, they are automati-
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cally vertically binding upon lower judicial officials and non-judicial 
personnel. 
The contradiction of progressivism arises from the fact that Su-
preme Court judgments must be just as ‘frozen’ as the Constitution, if 
they are to be binding. We have not been given any principled reason, 
however, why this kind of frozenness is palatable while the other kind 
is to be rejected. Instead of the ‘frozen concepts’ of the Constitution, we 
have the frozen concepts captured by judgments. Although medical 
changes in contraception and abortion have advanced dramatically 
since 1973, Roe v. Wade remains the foundation upon which future law 
on abortion is to be made, regardless of new technologies, changed cir-
cumstances, and possibly different values.104 Similarly with rights – 
while we are to reject rights ‘frozen’ by the Constitution, we are to ac-
cept rights ‘frozen’ by the Supreme Court of generations past. Although 
the circumstances and the context of segregation was different in 
1954, when Brown was established, than it is today, Brown continues 
to hold as much force currently as it did then. 
It is certainly a good thing that Americans continue to enjoy these 
rights despite changing circumstances. But the basis upon which pro-
gressives enjoy the stability of these rulings seems in direct conflict 
with their own objections to originalism. Justices Blackmun and War-
ren have long since left the Supreme Court. If they could not have con-
ceived of the changes in abortion or segregation that have since en-
sued, the progressive ought then to reject the weight of their rulings. 
Justices Blackmun and Warren have also long since passed away. If so, 
why should the ‘dead hands’ of Justices Blackmun and Warren contin-
ue to rule over us through their opinions? 
The progressive doctrine rejects originalism as an appropriate doc-
trine for constitutional interpretation, favoring judgments made with 
an eye to contemporary values. But once the Court has passed these 
(progressive) rulings, progressives then appear to accept the legitima-
cy of originalism as a guide to judgment interpretation. Thus the mean-
ings of Court judgments are to be ‘fixed’ at the time of their promulga-
tion, and lower courts and non-judicial officials are then expected to 
demonstrate fidelity to those ‘fixed’ meanings. 
If progressives are to consistently reject frozen concepts, frozen 
rights, the tyranny of intentionalism, and the dead hand of the past, 
then they will have to do the same when it comes to rulings from the 
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Supreme Court. Unless good reasons are offered for why there should 
be a special exception carved out for the Supreme Court, a consistent 
application of the objections to originalism appears to undermine judi-
cial supremacy. Below we canvass how plausible such an exception 
might be. 
IV. WHAT’S LEFT AFTER THE DUST SETTLES: 
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND ORIGINALISM 
A. Defenses for Judicial Supremacy 
Progressives might argue that the apparent contradiction within 
their interpretive doctrine is a compromise between the need for sta-
bility (by reserving the authoritative role of interpretation to the Su-
preme Court) and the need for legitimacy (by exhorting the need to 
look to contemporary values). 
However, as our earlier examples have shown, the problems of dis-
agreement and bad faith could very well lead to the explosion of pro-
gressivism. Regardless of their attempts to balance the two, American 
progressives still reserve a preeminent role for the Supreme Court. The 
Court progressively sets the law of the land per contemporary values. 
Future Courts, though bound by horizontal stare decisis, have the au-
thority to ‘update’ previous decisions per contemporary values. 
The progressive doctrine relies on the Supreme Court to resolve the 
contradiction, because the nine members of America’s highest court 
are a select body. They are impartial, and they are wise. Below, we as-
sess two reasons to show why this is an inadequate defense. 
i. Bad faith and the “counter-majoritarian” contradiction 
Rorie Spill and Zoe Oxley point out that when reporters cover the 
Supreme Court, they tend to adopt a position of deference, “paint[ing] 
the justices as philosopher kings–-apolitical oracles of the Constitution 
and the law.”105 We would like to believe that because of various devic-
es-–e.g. the lack of term limits and appointments by the President, ra-
ther than by elections-–Supreme Court Justices are free from political 
influences. As such, they are not susceptible to bad faith rulings. 
But justices are, after all, human. Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover run 
an empirical study of the Supreme Court from 1953-1988. They find a 
0.8 correlation between a justice’s ideological values prior to confirma-
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tion, and their voting record on the Supreme Court.106 This is not to 
suggest that judges are voting in bad faith–-perhaps justices sincerely 
believe that the Constitution incorporates their own values. Each new 
case is thus interpreted accordingly. What it does suggest, however, is 
that Supreme Court justices may not perceive each new case the way 
progressives would like–-seen afresh via the light of contemporary 
values. 
Our critique is also not a type of naturalistic fallacy. We recognize 
that the progressive argument is that the Supreme Court does not fol-
low popular opinion, but it certainly ought to. Yet as the American pro-
gressive Jack Balkin has pointedly observed, “ought implies can.”107 
There is nothing in the progressive program that suggests that the Su-
preme Court is, or can be, uniquely placed to adhere to contemporary 
values. If anything, the converse is true. Part of the reason why Ameri-
cans place great faith in the Supreme Court is because of its function as 
a “counter-majoritarian check on the legislature and the executive.”108 
To accomplish his, or her, agenda, the progressive would thus require 
of the Supreme Court a role that it was not designed for. 
ii. Moral arbiters and experts 
Members of the America’s highest Court are undoubtedly learned. 
But the progressive is unconcerned about legal knowledge. Rather, the 
progressive program requires the Court to be fluent in the language of 
contemporary norms and mores. Supreme Court justices must be ever 
attuned to changes in public opinion. Occasionally, as in the case of gay 
rights, Americans might believe that the judges can “read the tea 
leaves” and “know where society is going.”109 
Once again, reality hardly matches up to the progressive dream. 
Supreme Court justices clearly do not see themselves as moral arbiters, 
or experts on public opinion. Originalist judges like Justice Scalia have 
remarked that they “frankly do not want to undertake [the] responsi-
bility” of “looking for what the moral perceptions of America [are].”110 
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Rather, he “sleep[s] very well at night, because [he] reads old English 
cases.”111 Progressive judges like Breyer have echoed the same senti-
ment. “If I catch myself saying, ‘I’m doing this because I think it’s mor-
ally good,’” says Breyer, “then I think to myself, that’s not my job.”112 
Nor, does it appear likely that the justices are inclined to reference 
public opinion seriously. We would be hard pressed to find a single 
Court opinion that referenced a public opinion poll. Nor would we be 
inclined to believe that members of the Supreme Court are attuned to 
the values of present-day Americans. The Supreme Court’s youngest 
member was born in 1960.113  
B. The Ouroboros of Originalism114 
It is worth noting that some of the problems that plague the pro-
gressive appear to also affect the originalist. Originalists uphold the 
fixed ‘original meaning’ of the Constitution. But the plethora of 
originalist theories–-intentionalism, public meaning originalism, etc.—
demonstrates that ‘original meaning’ can be as elusive a yardstick as 
the progressive’s public opinion. 
And even when putatively pledging allegiance to the same theory of 
originalism, the devil is still in the details when the theory is applied. In 
Lawrence v. Texas, both the dissent and the majority applied “‘expecta-
tion’ originalism.”115 Justice Scalia remarked, “it is obvious to us that 
[there is no] fundamental right . . . in 1868, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had 
criminal sodomy laws.”116 Whereas Justice Kennedy opined “far from 
possessing ‘ancient roots,’ American laws targeting same-sex couples 
did not develop until the last third of the 20th century.”117 Both referred 
to “time-dated” evidence of anti-sodomy laws, but arrived at diametri-
cally different conclusions.118 
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These same problems can apply to judgments as well. Lower courts 
and non-judicial actors might be inclined towards an originalist read-
ing of Supreme Court judgments, but there is no guarantee that all of 
them will agree on the same interpretation. However, unlike progres-
sivism, we might be inclined to believe that while an originalist meth-
odology is “no ironclad protection” against arbitrariness, it offers at 
least “some protection.”119 Without going into the merits of this com-
parative argument, we suggest that the ‘explosion of originalism’ may 
also exist, warranting further scholarly attention. 
More acutely, originalists, to avoid the explosion of differing 
originalist interpretations, must also turn to the doctrine of judicial su-
premacy. But here, originalists may run into problems. 
One such significant problem is circularity. Originalists sometimes 
argue that the Constitution directs its interpreters towards an original-
ist doctrine of interpretation. They sometimes then argue that this very 
interpretive theory affords absolute judicial supremacy to the Supreme 
Court. But as Dworkin and Tribe note, these directives are ultimately 
self-referential.120 We ought to obey the Court’s originalist rulings, be-
cause an originalist interpretation of the Constitution says so. And we 
know that this interpretative method is right, the logic runs, through 
an originalist reading of the Constitution. It is originalism “all the way 
down.”121 
Trickier still is a practical problem with disagreement about origi-
nal meaning. What if a non-judicial actor, or a lower court judge be-
lieves that the Supreme Court has incorrectly interpreted the Constitu-
tion, or past judgments? For a ‘pure’ originalist, his, or her, allegiance is 
to the original meaning of the Constitution and not to the Supreme 
Court per se.122 But in order to contain an explosion of originalism, 
originalists must take the extreme position that the Constitution’s orig-
inal meaning upholds judicial supremacy to the point where the Su-
preme Court may overrule any of the Constitution’s other promulga-
tions. It is hard to countenance that this degree of judicial power is 
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afforded by an original reading of the Constitution, but to avoid the 
scenario of an explosion, originalists must nevertheless subscribe to 
the sole and absolute interpretive ability of the Court. 
What this tells us is that practical exigencies countenance against 
‘pure’ originalism and progressivism. Both originalists and progres-
sives appear to require stare decisis and judicial supremacy as “prag-
matic exception[s]”123 to their own theories. Like the progressive, the 
originalist must cast her gaze outward. The stability function of the 
law, the impartiality of the Supreme Court, and matters of expertise are 
all reasons to be found outside of theories of pure originalism and pro-
gressivism. 
CONCLUSION 
We began our essay by extending the problems of progressivism 
from the Canadian context to the American one. Despite some differ-
ences, we find that analogous conflicts confront the archetypal Ameri-
can progressive. Progressives favor contemporary values, rejecting the 
incoherence, impracticality and anti-democratic nature of originalism. 
But in order to prevent free-for-all interpretation, they subscribe to the 
doctrines of stare decisis and judicial supremacy, resting their case for 
these doctrines on arguments that they had earlier rejected. 
Moreover, in carving out exemptions for the Supreme Court, we 
note that the progressives further contradict their ideology. Like Cana-
dian ‘living tree’ progressives, American ‘living constitutionalists’ need 
to justify their exceptions to the rule. To do otherwise is to espouse 
progressivism for me, but not for thee. 
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